Web application security for dynamic languages

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Who am I?

- Security Engineering Manager @ Etsy
 - Lead AppSec/NetSec/SecEng teams

Formerly @ iSEC Partners

 Books/presentations primarily focused on application and mobile security

What is Etsy?

Online marketplace for creative independent businesses

Scale at Etsy

1.5B pageviews/mo40M uniques/mo#50 by US traffic*


About this talk

Real world approaches to web application security challenges

About this talk

Specifically, techniques that are **simple** and **effective**

Continuous deployment?



<- What it (hopefully) isn't


Three words: iterate, iterate, iterate




Etsy pushes to production **30 times a day** on average



(dogs push too)



But doesn't the rapid rate of change mean things are less secure?!



Actually, the opposite is true

Being able to deploy quick is our **#1** security feature

Compared to

We'll rush that security fix. It will go out in the next release in about 6 weeks.

- Former vendor at Etsy

What it boils down to (spoiler alert)

Make things safe by default

Detect risky functionality / Focus your efforts

Automate the easy stuff

Know when the house is burning down

How have the traditional defenses for XSS worked out?



- Problems?
 - Often done on a per-input basis
 - Easy to miss an input or output
 - May use defenses in wrong context
 - Input validation pattern may block full HTML injection, but not injecting inside JS
 - May put defenses on the client side in JS
 - Etc ...

These problems miss the point

 The real problem is that it's hard to find where protections have been missed

How can we change our approach to make it simpler?

Input validation
Output encoding

Input validationOutput encoding

Encode dangerous HTML characters to HTML entities at the **very start** of your framework

To repeat... **Before** input reaches main application code

On the surface this doesn't seem like much of a change

Except, we've just made lots of XSS problems grep-able

Th yeah!



Now we look for a small number of patterns:

- HTML entity decoding functions or explicit string replacements
- Data in formats that won't be sanitized
 - Ex: Base64 encoded, double URL encoded, etc
- Code that opts out of platform protections

Fundamentally shifts us:

From: "Where is my app missing protections?" (hard)

To: "Where is it made deliberately unsafe?" (easy)

Obviously not a panacea

- DOM based XSS
- Javascript: URLs
- Can be a pain during internationalization efforts

Focus your efforts

Focus your efforts

Continuous deployment means code ships fast

 Things will go out the door before security team knows about them

How can we detect high risk functionality?

Detect risky functionality

 Know when sensitive portions of the codebase have been modified

- Build automatic change alerting on the codebase
 - Identify sensitive portions of the codebase
 - Create automatic alerting on modifications

Detect risky functionality

Doesn't have to be complex to be effective

Approach:

- sha1sum sensitive platform level files
- Unit tests alert if hash of the file changes
- Notifies security team on changes, drives code review

Detect risky functionality

- At the platform level, watching for changes to site-wide sensitive functionality
 - CSRF defenses
 - Session management
 - Encryption wrappers
 - Login/Authentication
 - Etc

 At the feature level, watching for changes to specific sensitive methods

 Identifying these methods is part of initial code review/pen test of new features

Watch for dangerous functions

- Usual candidates:
 - File system operations
 - Process execution/control
 - Encryption / Hashing
 - Etc

- Unit tests watch codebase for dangerous functions
 - Split into separate high risk/low risk lists

Alerts are emailed to the appsec team, drive code reviews

Monitor application traffic

- Purpose is twofold:
 - Detecting risky functionality that was missed by earlier processes
 - Groundwork for attack detection and verification

- Regex incoming requests at the framework
 - Sounds like performance nightmare, shockingly isn't

- Look for HTML/JS in request
 - This creates a huge number of false positives
 - That's by design, we refine the search later


We deliberately want to cast a wide net to see
 HTML entering the application

- From there, build a baseline of HTML
 - Entering the application in aggregate
 - Received by specific endpoints

What to watch for:

- Did a new endpoint suddenly show up?
 - A new risky feature might've just shipped

- Did the amount of traffic containing HTML just significantly go up?
 - Worth investigating



Aggregate increased, time to investigate

 Automate finding simple issues to free up resources for more complex tasks

Use attacker traffic to automatically drive testing

We call it Attack Driven Testing

- Some cases where this is useful:
 - Application faults
 - Reflected XSS
 - SQLi

Application faults (HTTP 5xx errors)

- As an attacker, these are one of the first signs of weakness in an app
 - As a defender, pay attention to them!

 Just watching for 5xx errors results in a lot of ephemeral issues that don't reproduce

Instead:

- Grab last X hours worth of 5xx errors from access logs
- Replay the original request
- Alert on any requests which still return a 5xx

Cron this script to run every few hours


 If a request still triggers an application fault hours later, it's worth investigating

Similar methodology for verifying reflected XSS


- For reflected XSS we:
 - Identify requests containing basic XSS payloads
 - Replay the request
 - Alert if the XSS payload executed

- Basic payloads commonly used in testing for XSS:
 - alert()
 - document.write()
 - unescape()
 - String.fromCharCode()
 - etc

We created a tool to use NodeJS as a headless browser for verification











3. Inject our instrumented JS into page contents





Test webserver







5. If instrumented JS is executed, alert appsec team for review





Test webserver

Sample instrumented JS:

```
(function() {
var proxiedAlert = window.alert;
window.alert = function() {
    location="XSSDETECTED";
    };
})();
```

- Open sourced NodeJS tool
 - https://github.com/zanelackey/projects

- Combine this approach with driving a browser via Watir/Selenium
 - Make sure to use all major browsers

Graph early, graph often

Which of these is a quicker way to spot a problem?

```
se.css" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101 Fi
refox/10.0" - - -
--- [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /images/sprites/buttons-master.png HTT
P/1.1" 304 - "http:// assets/dist/88166671/css/
modules/buttons-new.css" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0" - - - !
- 12156
---- [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /images/spinners/spinner16.gif HTTP/1.
1" 304 - "http://! \(\alpha\) assets/dist/88166671/css/base
.css" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101 Fire
fox/10.0" - - - ! 18810
- - - [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /assets/dist/88166671/js/convos/thread
s.js HTTP/1.1" 200 61743 "http://
                                                  /conversations?re
f=si_con" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/10.0" - - -
--- [20/Feb/2012:22:32:10 +0000] "GET /assets/dist/88166671/js/bootstrap/com
mon.js HTTP/1.1" 200 127238 "http://
?ref=si_con" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/201001
01 Firefox/10.0" - - - 1
- - - [20/Feb/2012:22:32:11 +0000] "GET /assets/dist/88166671/js/overlays/exte
rnal-link.js HTTP/1.1" 200 487 "http://
ons?ref=si_con" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:10.0) Gecko/201
```



- Methodology:
 - Instrument application to collect data points
 - Fire them off to an aggregation backend
 - Build individual graphs
 - Combine groups of graphs into dashboards
- We've open sourced our instrumentation library
 - https://github.com/etsy/statsd






Now we can visually spot attacks

But who's watching at 4AM?


 In addition to data visualizations, we need automatic alerting

 Look at the raw data to see if it exceeds certain thresholds

Works well for graphs like this...




But not like this...




We need to smooth out graphs that follow usage patterns

 Use exponential smoothing formulas like Holt-Winters

Math is hard, let's look at screenshots!





Now that we've smoothed out the graphs...

- Use the same approach as before:
 - Grab the raw data
 - Look for values above/below a set threshold
 - Alert

Alert on events that (should) never happen

Successful attacks don't happen in a vacuum!

They generate **signals**

 Figure out what the signal of a weakness being identified looks like

Alert when a signal occurs

Fix the identified weaknesses

Two examples: SQLi and code execution

 The road to exploited SQLi is littered with broken queries

- 1. Watch the logs for SQL syntax errors
- 2. Alert when they appear
- 3. Fix the lack of validation allowing the error

 Further along the attack process, a SQLi attack looks like... your database

 Sensitive DB table names shouldn't be showing up in requests

Alert if they do!

A funny story about code execution...


 preg_replace() in PHP has an interesting modifier

"e (PREG_REPLACE_EVAL) If this modifier is set, preg_replace() does normal substitution of backreferences in the replacement string, evaluates it as PHP code, and uses the result for replacing the search string."

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"e (PREG_REPLACE_EVAL) If this modifier is set, preg_replace() does normal substitution of backreferences in the replacement string, evaluates it as PHP code, and uses the result for replacing the search string."


What do the signals for this look like?



You can't fix what you're not alerting on

Conclusions





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Focus your efforts / Detect risky functionality

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Thanks!



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References / Thanks

DevOpsSec:

http://www.slideshare.net/nickgsuperstar/ devopssec-apply-devops-principles-to-security

- Special Thanks:
 - Nick Galbreath, Dan Kaminsky, Marcus Barczak